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Introduction
During the last two centuries, the theory of moral rights has been significantly 
developed by many thinkers. Though this development began in the field of political 
philosophy, it finally brought a great change in the structure of society in the real 
world. There is no doubt that nowadays people are much more aware of the 
importance of these moral rights and care much more about the rights issues than 
they use to. Yet there are several problems which haveri t been solved. One of these 
problems is the problem of punishment, or, more precisely, the criminal s legal 
liability to punishment, which has remained a debatable issue in the area of moral 
rights theory. As A. H. Goldman says, “ the paradox of punishment is that a penal 
institution somewhat similar to that in use in our society seems from a moral point of 
view to be both required and unjustified.” 1 In another words, from a moral point of 
view, punishment needs to be justified in a fashion consistent with human rights 
(which are, of course, moral rights) argument, but philosophers and theorists of 
human rights have not come to any general agreement yet. Even so, there are some 
methods to find out a possible way for people to face this paradox, and one of them, I 
think, can be relayed on the examination of the coherence of rights arguments for 
punishment. It is not to say that we should let £ coherence become a crucial 
justification of truth, and use it to decide which rights argument is more believable 
than others. The purpose of using the conception of coherence is to find out which 
argument is 4 less falsd , and a 4 less falsd argument might be able to lead us to a 
possible way to solve the problem. Therefore, in this thesis I want to examine the 
justification of punishment in some well-known theories of moral/human rights, and I 
want to find out if any of these justifications is more coherent than the others, that is 
to say, to ask whether, if punishment is necessary for our rights, it can be incorporated 
into moral rights theory without contradiction.
Now let us turn to the core of the problem of punishment from the moral point of 
view. Generally speaking, we may say the core of this problem is this: 44 Will 
punishment cause a self-contradictory conclusion in moral rights theory?’ Why might 
one think that punishment would cause a self-contradictory conclusion in our rights
1 A. H. Goldman, ‘ The Paradox of Punishment , in A. J. Simmons, M Cohen, J. Cohen, and C. R.
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theory? The problem might arise from salient features of punishment itself It is 
considered that punishment is a form of legal sanction, and its main function is to 
protect peopld s legal rights by deterring rights-offenders. One feature of punishment 
is that it involves the deprivation of certain normally recognized rights, a means 
which is considered unpleasant to the offender. The problem is not that people doubt 
as to whether or not punishment is justifiable. For the most part, punishment has been 
accepted in our society as the proper response to offence. The question is about the 
“ right to punish’ . Why is it just for a particular person or any legal authorities to 
punish the offender? And, furthermore, why is it just to punish the offender by 
depriving his moral/legal right? How can a rights theory defend punishment in the 
face of these problems? If the rights theory cannot give answers to these questions, 
punishment would be something like“ repay evil for evil’ , and the“ right to punish’ is 
just another form of right-violation. Our moral rights can be violated if it is necessary 
to protect them. This is not only against our view of morality, but also the conclusion 
the rights theorist will not want.
Therefore, a sound argument in justification of punishment within the rights theory 
should be able to solve these problems, without creating the contradiction between 
punishment and rights. To find out whether there is such an argument in some well- 
known rights theories and why it is plausible will be the major work in this thesis. In 
the process of discovery, we will also examine those arguments which are used to 
justify the moral legitimacy of authorities, and doctrines of moral/human rights. This 
is another way, I think, to discover how far our structure of rights may prevent our 
beliefs concerning rights from incoherence and collapse. Moreover, discussion of the 
justification of punishment is important “ not simply because of our deep and natural 
desire to better understand the foundations of our own societies. It is also important 
because of the contribution such efforts can make to ongoing public debates about 
punishment.” 2
Moreover, since the debate over the problem of justification of punishment is such an 
important but also controversial issue, it contains many plausible arguments and
Beitz(ed) Punishment (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p30.
2 A  J. Simmons (ed.) Punishment. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. viii.
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answers in history. To lighten my burden, I will limit my discussion of punishment to 
arguments that are widely used in the rights theory, and, fortunately, there are two 
arguments that are commonly used to divide the discussion of punishment into two 
groups. The two arguments which can fulfill my purpose are utilitarianism and 
consent theory. Few doubt, as I mentioned before, that the existence of punishment 
does promote welfare in our society. From this aspect, utilitarianism seems to be 
capable of giving a normative theory about punishment on the grounds of utility, as 
well as a normative argument about rights. On the other hand, if we can show that 
punishment is justified because it gives offenders what they morally4 deservd , or we 
can say that even the offender agrees to ways of thinking about his or her liability to 
be punished as a necessary consequence of his or her offence, then the problem is 
solved. Furthermore, there are two traditional views of punishment which have been 
mentioned by moral rights theorists, and they have reflected two aspects of 
punishment in our society, that is, the retributivist and deterrence account. From this 
point of view, it wori t be a surprise for us to know that it has been proposed by some 
theorists that while the justification of the practice of punishment is utilitarian 
(deterrence), the justification for the distribution of specific punishments within that 
practice is retributive3. However, since their views are not very correlative to my 
purpose, I would like to keep my attention to the two famous human rights arguments 
of the justification of punishment in this thesis, and try to find out if their arguments 
are able to provide a plausible answer for our problem.
3 See A. J. Simmons, M. Cohen, J. Cohen, and C. R. Beitz (ed.), ibid., pp. viii-ix. But the general 
difficulty of aligning practices of punishment with respect for human rights cannot be solved in this 
way. This is H. L. A. Harf s attempt to show how both retributivism and deterrence can find a place 
(consistently) in our thinking about punishment
SECTION 1 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS
According to the normal procedure of arguing or inferring a framework for a theory in 
political philosophy, the first thing we should do is to clarify the idea which will be 
discussed or employed in the issue. This step is not only necessary for us to define our 
purpose, but also will be helpful for us to limit our focus. For this reason, before we 
turn to discuss the utilitarian justification of punishment, the first thing that we should 
do is to clarify several ideas such as what the general account of rights is, and, for this 
reason, I think, it seems that we should clarify the meaning of4 rights from the very 
beginning in this section. Therefore, let me begin with the concept of rights.
1.1 The concept of rights
Though, as I mentioned before, people nowadays are much more conscious about the 
importance of their rights than any other time in human history, and they understand 
that moral rights can keep them away from treating each other like means, it is not 
enough for us to draw a clear picture from peopld s awareness of what their rights are 
supposed to be, how this concept works, and why it is important. Usually, there is no 
doubts that when we assert that an agent X has a right of doing A, it means that this 
agent can do or not do A as he wants to, and no one else can forbid X from doing A or, 
on the contrary, force X to do A without sufficient reasons. Therefore, we may 
analyse the meaning by saying, minimally, that“ X has a right of doing A’ is, in other 
words, this agent has no duty not to do A. There are, of course, many other meanings 
of this assertion such as what kind of duty X is supposed to have, and how far his 
liberty of doing A can be protected from othef s interference. But before these 
questions force us to think deeper of the conception o r 4 rights, we may try to draw a 
draft of this concept in this section.
Briefly speaking, people usually distinguish two broad categories of rights, that is, 
moral rights and legal rights. The former are thought to exist independently of social
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recognition and enforcement4, and the foundation of these rights are established from 
the moral point of view; the latter are rights and liberties which are bestowed by 
systems of juridical law5, that is to say, rights which are admitted and defined, and 
respected by political authorities and juridical institutions. But this does not give us a 
full understanding of what ‘ rights means. Therefore, it seems to be better for us to 
classify what the different features of4 rights may be, rather than to argue for the two 
rough categories of human rights. Generally speaking, the concept o f  rights can be 
divided into the following groups6:
A. Liberty/Liberty Rights
Rights in this sense have also been described as“ mere liberties (this concept, I think 
must be familiar for Hobbesians, but I do not intend to explain what Hobbes’ view of 
it is). These rights may be conferred by the systems of rules or law, or where the law 
or rules are silent, that is to say, people are at liberty to do what law, or rules do not 
restrain. In regard to this definition of rights, such rights are described as “ mere 
liberties . People who have rights in this narrow sense are rights-holders who have no 
duty to refrain from acting, that is, they have no duty not to do what they are at liberty 
to do such as to appropriate by their labor some particular unowned good. Such rights 
are based on the silence of the law or rules. A liberty right is the mere absence of duty, 
or the absence of an obligation to refrain, they are rights which are not protected by 
correlative duties on the part of others. Rights in this sense are liberties which are not 
forbidden by law, but it does not follow that the law therefore imposes any duty on 
others to respect or allow performance of these liberties. Suppose that you and I 
happen to see an unowned wild field, and I think that I am at liberty to wander on it 
without going against any rules, that is my liberty right. However, my right to wander 
on this field does not impose a new duty to refrain from doing the same act on you; 
you are also at liberty to wander in it or do other things which you want to unless this 
field is owned by some one else. As long as this field is unowned, both of us are also 
at liberty to appropriate it by our labor. The rights we have, in this sense, are liberties, 
and that is a kind of rights with no correlative duties on the part of others.
4 See D. Lyons, ‘ Utility and Rights , in J. Waldron (ed.) Theory of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), p ill .
5 See J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy (New Jersey: Englewood Cliff, 1973), p55.
6 See A  J. Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),
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B. Moral Power
This implies a proper moral power governing the ascription of rights and duties, that 
is, “ a moral ability to change or impose other peopld s (claim) rights or duties7. 
Briefly speaking, it is not a general kind of rights, but it is a very important sort of 
rights from the moral point of view. It is the moral power that rights have, and if the 
rights-holder exercises this power, everyone is liable to have their moral status 
changed by it. With this kind of power, or, more precisely, this kind of rights, right­
holders will be at the position to change their moral status, and once an agent has 
claimed such a power/right in the moral sense, will immediately change the moral 
status between him and other agents, and imposes immediately on others new rights 
or duties in regard to his power. According to Simmond view, the moral power is 
very much like the legal power, it is a “ higher ordef5 right, and it “ can be either 
perfect (requiring no one elsd s participation) or imperfect (requiring the willing 
cooperation of others).” 8 For example, suppose that you and I wander around an 
unowned wild field, suddenly I dig a hole for water and make it a well, then with this 
action I have exercised my moral power to impose on you a new duty to respect this 
well as my property; therefore, my power to make property has changed the moral 
status between us. Furthermore, if after I have created the well, I decide to let you 
have it, and you agree to accept, then again with my moral power, I have created a 
new right that you own this well as your property. Hence, in both of cases you are 
“ subject5 to my “ pow er, and, from the moral point of view, I alter your moral 
situation.
C. The Claim Rights
The claim rights are, in Simmons words, “ protected liberties, that is, rights which 
have correlative duties of others to the right-holder. These are rights which are 
thought to be the central category of rights in Lockd s theory. The correlative duties of 
others to the right-holder may be based on law or rules, but they may also be based on 
the moral force of rights. Therefore, “ in appropriate circumstances the right-holder 
can “ urgently, peremptorily, or insistently5 call for his rights, or assert them
pp71-73. Simmons also mentions that he follows Hohfeld s analysis of legal powers.
7 A. J. Simmons, op. cit. p72.
8 See J. Simmons, op. cit. p72.
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authoritatively, confidently, unabashedly’9, and impose on others the duty not to 
interfere. Furthermore, these rights can be divided into two kinds, that is, positive 
claim rights and negative claim rights. A positive right is a right to other person^ 
positive actions, that is, someone else has a duty to do something. By contrast, a 
negative right is a right to other person^ omissions or forbearances, which means that 
others have duties to refrain from doing something.10 For instance, if you get a loan 
from that bank, then that bank will have a positive right with respect to you, that is to 
say, my bank may impose a duty on you to repay your debt; that is a right to positive 
action from you. In the case of negative right, however, the money in my bank will 
impose a duty on you not to take it, and that is a negative claim right to your 
omissions.11 No matter which kind of claim rights is considered in different situations, 
such rights will always correlate with and protected by the duty of others, and that is 
why they are described as“ protected liberties .
Now we have a rough view of the meaning of rights. When an agent X asserts his 
right, it is not only to claim that he has no duty not to do certain acts, but also may 
give rise to correlative duties of others to do or not to do certain acts toward him. The 
duty of others may come from the definitions of a system of law or rules, and they 
may also come from the moral point of view. No matter which sense of rights is 
considered in the rights theory, the most basic feature of rights is the absence of an 
obligation to refrain on the part of the right-holder. It seems that we may find out why 
rights are important for our lives; after all, a world with rights is one “ in which all 
persons, as actual or potential claimants, are dignified objects of respect, both in their 
own eyes and in the view of others.” 12 Such a description might be true. But it cannot 
prevent us raising other questions: what makes X s rights morally ‘ right ? That is to 
say, what is the moral basis of X s rights? Can we justify the moral foundation of 
rights? How can we decide what moral rights we can claim? Trying to solve these 
problems, or to reply by providing a convincing argument is the response to every 
rights theory, and a theory cannot be regarded as a theory of human rights unless it
9 See J. Feinberg, op. cit. p. 58.
10 See J. Feinberg, op. cit. p59.
11 In some cases, according to Feinberg s analysis, there may be a negative element in positive rights 
and a positive element in negative rights. The right of an accident victim to be assisted by anyone who 
happens to be in a position to help is positive and negative. See J. Feinberg, op. cit. p60.
12 See J. Feinberg, op. cit. p59.
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can pass this test. Once we have a theory available, we can use it to examine the 
problem of the consistency of the practice of punishment with our human rights 
claims.
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SECTION 2 
UTILITARIANISM, RIGHTS AND PUNISHMENT
2.1 Rights and Utility
Now we may begin our analysis of the utilitarian accounts of rights. Criticism of the 
capability of utilitarianism of accommodating rights is complex. One line of criticism 
argues that utilitarians are hostile to moral rights but have no difficulty 
accommodating legal rights and providing a normative theory about them13. This 
impression of utilitarianism, according to D. Lyons’ s analysis in his article, may come 
from the spirit of Bentham. This is a spirit of hostility and skepticism to moral rights 
or, more precisely, natural rights. In Benthani s approach, he holds that “ meaningful 
statements about rights must be understood as statements about beneficial obligations, 
and he holds that statements about obligations concern the requirements of coercive 
legal rules.” 14 Therefore, he rejects the very idea of natural rights, for he rejects the 
central doctrines associated with them, that is, there are moral rights which are 
conferred naturally or discovered by the light of our natural reason. And he is 
skeptical whether there really exist such natural rights which appeal to natural law. 
Therefore, one has a right if and only if one is supposed to benefit from another 
persori s compliance with a coercive legal rule. He could not, in this sense, recognize 
rights that are independent of social recognition or enforcement, that is, the natural 
moral rights15. Hence, for Lyons, though “ it seems that his (Benthanf s) analysis of 
rights neither follows from a principle of utility nor entails if’ , “ it is arguable that, 
given his utilitarianism, Bentham could not have accepted the idea that we have any 
moral rights,” and“ his utilitarianism committed him to The Exclusion Thesis.” 16
For this reason, though there seems to be no difficulty in giving a utilitarian account 
of legal rights, it seems to be incapable of accounting for moral rights, and, therefore,
13 D. Lyons, op. cit. p. 112. In his writing, he distinguishes two normative theses of utilitarianism: the 
Moral Rights Exclusion Thesis and the Legal Rights Inclusion Thesis. They are distinguished, he 
argues, because they show two different things: the limitation and capability of utilitarianism of 
accommodating of rights.
14 D. Lyons, op. cit., pi 14.
15 See D. Lyons, op. cit. ppll3-114.
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its feature of being hostile to moral rights, in Lyons view, has made the whole theory 
unsuitable to provide an account of the moral force of rights. Before we go further 
from Lyons' point of view, there is one thing should be clarified, that is, the argument 
from Bentham of denying the existence of natural moral rights does not mean that 
only legal rights can exist in the utilitarian account of rights. Bentham only tries to 
clear away the natural rights argument from the ground of rights theory. He cannot, 
and will not, deny the existence of moral rights in our society, and everyone knows 
that some time these rights are not conferred by any law. For instance, the right to 
ask someone to keep his promise could be a mere moral right. Suppose that yesterday 
you promised to help me with my housework today, it would be your moral right to 
do so and my moral right to ask you to keep your promise, and you have a moral duty 
to keep to your words. Neither my right nor your duty is conferred by law. If you do 
what you said to me, then it would be a morally right thing; however, if you say “ I 
know what I promised to you yesterday, but now, I have changed my mind’ , then, of 
course, your behavior will be considered as to be morally wrong, you have offended 
my moral right. In most cases, if you do not keep your words to me, from the moral 
point of view, I can ask you to keep it to fulfill your duty to me; however, it does not 
mean that my rights in this sense can be regarded as a legal right, and your breach of 
promise is not considered to be against the law. Therefore, we may say that, according 
to Lyon£ view, the utilitarian might not be able to explain the moral force of moral 
rights, and they might be clever enough to account for the legal rights on the ground 
of utility, but we cannot say the utilitarian will not admit the existence of moral rights.
However, even we can agree that the utilitarian will not deny the existence of moral 
right, from Lyons’ point of view, the whole theory will still be unsuitable to provide 
an account of the moral force of rights, that is, the moral threshold of rights. Rights 
are not necessarily absolute, but when we say someone has a right to do something, 
this means we provide a shell against others interference, that is, an argumentative 
threshold, which, in Lyons' s words, explains the normative force of rights. The right­
holder need not show that his right to something is useful or valuable for the sake of 
welfare, and it is not wrong for this rights-holder to use his right even at some cost to 
overall welfare. Furthermore, “ others may not interfere just because it would promote
16 D. Lyons, op. cit., pi 14.
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overall welfare to some degree if they did’ .17 Suppose that I have a right to speak, and 
this means that I have no duty not to speak, and, moreover, the right provides a moral 
threshold against other^ interference. As a holder of such a right, I do not need to 
prove that my speaking is valuable, useful, or able to promote overall welfare. Even if 
I say something unpleasant to other members in my society, I can still properly use 
my right to speak, but it would be wrong for others to interfere just because that 
would promote welfare. The moral force of my rights will defeat the objections. 
According to Lyons’ analysis, however, the argument of utilitarianism seems to be 
unable to provide such an argumentative threshold of rights, for the argument ignores 
the moral force of rights. Hence, if one accepts moral rights, one cannot accept 
absolute guidance by welfare argument.
Another example of this kind of criticism is in R. Dworkiif s argument of rights and 
utility. In his argument, rights should be considered as trumps over utility. Rights are 
best understood, in this sense, as in the following description: “ if someone has a right 
to publish pornography, this means that it is for some reason wrong for officials to act 
in violation of that right, even if they (correctly) believe that the community as a 
whole would be better off if they did” 18 In this description, utility must not be the 
only important ideal, and it must yield to a right of moral independence, for the 
purpose of protecting persons.
Suppose there is a utilitarian community, the goal of political decisions is to fulfil as 
many of peopld s preferences for their own lives as possible (the principle of utility). 
It might be supposed that there will always be the possibility of justifying an 
infringement of rights by calculating utility, or giving less weight to some persons 
than to others, or discounting some preferences because these are ‘ ignobld , and 
rejecting their claims. Utilitarian theorists may reply that this is the corrupt version of 
utilitarianism. A sound utilitarianism, as utilitarian theorists insist, should “ claim that 
people are treated as equals when the preferences of each, weighted only for intensity, 
are balanced in the same scales, with no distinctions for persons or merit.” 19 But if this
17 D. Lyons, op. cit., pi 15.
18 R. Dworkin,4 Rights as Trumps' , in J. Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), p i53.
19R. Dworkin, op. cit., pi 54.
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community accepts a false political preference theory, like the Nazi, whose set of 
preferences includes that some people have more of their preferences satisfied or 
some people have less or none, the utilitarian cannot defeat rather than fulfil the false 
theory without facing contradiction. The utilitarian cannot “ accept at once a duty to 
defeat the false theory_ and a duty to strive to fulfil the political preferences of those 
who passionately accept that false theory, as energetically as it strives for any other 
preferences” 20 Therefore, Dworkin argues, “ one very practical way to achieve this 
restriction is provided by the idea of rights as trumps over unrestricted 
utilitarianisnf21, and the right of moral independence is part of the same collection of 
rights, and as a trump over a utilitarian justification of giving some people less or 
some people more in a society with a false political preference theory.
According to these two critics, we find that the utilitarian theorist has to face two 
major difficulties accommodating moral rights in terms of utility, that is, the difficulty 
of building an effective threshold for rights and the difficulty of preventing a political 
preference theory accommodating the violation of our rights. However, utilitarian 
theorists still try to establish a normative theory about rights. The directly utilitarian 
account of rights, such as Benthanf s argument, would hold that rights are to be 
evaluated solely in terms of social interests or welfare. The utilitarian calculation of 
consequences is capable of conferring rights upon persons in order to maximize utility. 
But the question arises: can this account of rights surmount the argumentative 
threshold of persoif s rights?22 As Lyons mentioned in his article, if a person has a 
right to do something, he is entitled to do it rightfully, and his right provides a 
threshold against objections, as well as limits to others interference. If there were a 
directly utilitarian account of rights, however, persons may not defend their rights if 
this were at some cost to overall welfare, and others may interfere just because it 
would promote overall welfare to some degree if they did. If we accept the directly 
utilitarian account of rights, we have to accept the conclusion that follows from it: we
20 R. Dworkin, op. cit. pl57. In his article, he also argues that what ensures the utilitarian cannot avoid 
the contradiction is that utilitarianism does not give weight to the truth of the theory, but just to that fact 
that many people hold that theory. The distinction between the truth and the fact of the false political 
preference theory , collapses, because if utilitarianism counts the fact of these preference it has denied 
what it cannot deny, which is that justice requires it to oppose them.
21 R. Dworkin, op. cit., pl58.
22 See D. Lyons, op. cit.,p 115.
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cannot actually have any moral shell for our rights, because the utilitarian argument 
cannot provide an argumentative threshold of rights. An alternative way forward for 
utilitarian theorists is to derive the argument from “ indirect utilitarianisnf . The term 
“ indirect’ is used to describe the central feature of this kind of utilitarian argument: 
such argument appeals to the principle of utility for accommodating rights indirectly. 
There are two arguments I shall mention in the following paragraphs.
2.2 Indirect Utilitarian Argument of Rights
The argument derived from Miir s Utilitarianism 23is based upon. Mill s analysis of 
moral rights and obligations in it. In Mill s thesis, “ when we call anything a persori s 
right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of 
it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion.” 24 In case of directly 
accommodating rights and their moral bases in utility, he distinguishes three levels of 
normative concepts and judgement.25 The most concrete level concerns the rightness 
or wrongness, justice or injustice, morality or immorality of particular acts. The 
second level consists of moral principles, which concern general moral rights and 
obligations. Judgements of right and wrong conduct at the most concrete level are 
functions of moral rights and obligations and of nothing else. Since moral rights are 
assumed to be correlative to obligations, as Mill argues, “ duties of perfect obligation 
are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or 
person^’26, and “ aright in some person, correlative to the moral obligatioif11, this can 
be put solely in terms of obligations. The third, topmost level is of normative 
judgements and concepts concerning the values (the value at work here is human 
happiness or welfare) that may be invoked to establish moral principles. Therefore, 
moral principles about general rights and obligations are supposed to have a direct 
relationship to the principle of utility, but judgements concerning the rightness or 
wrongness of particular actions have no such relation.
23 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1859), in M. Wamock (ed.) (Glasgow: William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 
1977).
24 J. S. Mill, ibid, p309.
25 This account is completely utilitarian. Mill continues: “ If the objector goes on to ask, why it out (to 
have rights)? I can give him no other reason that general utility.” (Utilitarianism, ch5, p309).
26 J. S. Mill, op. cit., p305.
27 J. S. Mill, op. cit., p.305.
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The statement can be found in Milf s analysis of justice, when a law is thought to be 
unjust, “ it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach 
of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody s right; which, as it cannot in this 
case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is called a moral right’’28 
And justice “ implies something which is not only right to do, or wrong not to do, but 
which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right. No one has a 
moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to 
practice those virtues towards any given individual.” 29 The rightness or wrongness of 
an action depends on whether it respects moral rights and obligations, not directly on 
the basis of direct utilitarian reasoning30. Therefore, we may have avoided the 
possibility that a violation of rights may be justified as morally right on the ground of 
utilitarianism.
The second indirect utilitarian argument defending rights goes like this: there are two 
levels in our moral thinking which need to be distinguished. We use principles or 
criteria at the first level in order to select those guides or establish rules at another 
level by which to conduct people? s life31. The guides selected or rules established will 
be those whose general acceptance will maximize utility. One of the best examples of 
this sort of argument is to be found in R. M. Hard s theory. According to his argument, 
if the guides selected, at the first level, take the form of principles, then most of our 
moral thinking at the second level will take the form of trying to decide what it would 
be right to do, on the basis of these principles. Furthermore, given the principles 
selected by utilitarianism, what is right is what is in accordance with the principles; 
and if our principles at the second level confer some rights upon us, then, unless we 
have a conflict of principles or are confronted with a situation which our principles 
cannot readily deal with, an act is wrong if it infringes one of these rights. In this way,
28 J. S. Mill, op. cit., p299.
29 J. S. Mill, op. cit., p305.
30 See D. Lyons, op. cit., ppl34-135.
31 The two-level argument in utilitarian theories may be found in R. M. Hard s Moral Thinking ( Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982) and J. Rawl£ s‘ Two Conceptions of Rule£ , in P. Foot (ed.) Theories of 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). In Hard s theory, he distinguishes two levels: critical 
level and intuitive level. In Rawls* thinking, he shows the importance of the distinction between 
justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it.
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indirect utilitarianism founds moral rights in utility32.
Now we can see that these two arguments are concerned with the evaluation of law 
and social institutions. We may apply the principle of utility to the rules and 
institutions at first, not to the justification of consequences of actions or decisions in 
particular cases. The justification of rules and institutions are supposed to have a 
direct relationship to the principle of utility. Rules and institutions are morally 
justifiable only if they are designed to serve the general welfare, and are capable of 
satisfying this purpose.33 If the rules and institutions are justified in terms of utility, 
then most of our actions and decisions in particular cases will try to conform to what 
it would be ‘ righf to do, on the basis of the rules requirements. Moreover, given the 
rules justified by utilitarianism, what is right is that action in accordance with the 
rules; and if our rules and institutions confer some rights upon us, then, unless we 
have a conflict of rules or are confronted with a situation which our principles cannot 
readily deal with, an act is wrong if it infringes our rights.34
One example can be found in RawN thesis, especially in his“ Two concepts o f Rules’' . 
In RawN approach, a utilitarian would accept institutions that are justified on 
utilitarian grounds. Institutions are justified if they promote human welfare. Social 
rules and institutions that are supported by the utilitarian principles will require 
decisions in particular cases, that is, the practice conception of rules. Therefore, 
institutions ought to be designed so that people or officials as well as private decisions 
will by and large promote such a value to the extent that this can be contrived. Yet the 
whole system would not allow any person or any official in such a system to have 
power to violate any persorf s interests whenever it is thought to promote social 
welfare. “ The reason is that, on the practice conception of rules, rules are not 
generalizations from the decisions of individuals applying the utilitarian principle 
directly and independently to recurrent particular cases.” Rules define a practice and 
are themselves the subject of the utilitarian principle, and individual^ actions and
32 See R. G. Frey, op. cit. pp.70-71.
33 See D. Lyons, ibid., pp. 121-123.
34 See R. G. Frey. ‘ Act-utilitarianism. Consequentialism, and Moral Rights , in R. G. Frey (ed.), Utility 
and Rights (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 70-71.
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decisions in particular cases are justified under it.35
The same argument now is able to be used to account for rights in utilitarianism. The 
improved criterion is not the greatest benefit of society simply, but the greatest benefit 
of society subject to the constraint that no ond s rights may be violated. An indirect 
utilitarian theorist can say that certain rights would be conferred by legal institutions 
that are justified by his basic normative principles. Institutions designed to serve the 
general welfare are capable of conferring the proper range of freedom and impose the 
appropriate restrictions upon otherd behavior that correspond to the range of freedom, 
and human welfare is to be promoted by accommodating rights and obligations under 
justified rules, therefore, institutions conforming to utilitarian requirements would 
incorporate certain rights. When such a system is justified, it is to be followed. 
Because of these reasons, once persoii s rights are conferred by institutions, and 
institutions are thought to be logically prior to particular cases, then any one or any 
official in the system could not justifiably have power to violate persori s rights 
whenever it is thought for the benefit of social welfare. Such power could not be 
justified under the rules on utilitarian ground.
Since any theory of rights should be capable of accommodating rights in its argument, 
and provides an argumentative threshold of rights, the best way of evaluating Rawls’ 
utilitarian theory of rights is to use its argument in accounting for some rights that are 
taken seriously in our mind. One of the best candidates is the right to private property. 
It may not be the most important right we have, but we can hardly imagine a society 
in which no one will need and be entitled to have some goods for their own interests 
in their lives. If there are conflicts among these individuals in pursuit of their interests, 
then people naturally need some rules that are concerned “ to lay down the proper 
duties and power of ow ners, and find “ the causes and consequences of the 
distribution of titles of ownership.” 36 Therefore, we may use Rawls’ version of 
institutional practical utilitarian to account for the right to private property, and see 
where it leads us.
35 J. Rawls, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
36 A. Ryan,‘ Utility and Ownership , in R. G. Frey (ed.), Utility and Rights (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1985), pl75.
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A possible approach may be like this: utilitarian grounds of rights to private property, 
claim that such rights may be justified or not for instrumental reasons, that is to say, if 
we defend rights to something, we may find that the best way is to embody these 
rights in law by defining such rights and the correlative duties (but these instrumental 
reasons do not themselves necessarily involve reference to rights). The justification of 
our rights to property, however, is to show how institutions which define and enforce 
such rights and the correlative duties can best promote the general welfare. If so, then 
the conclusion follows: institutions designed to serve the general welfare would and 
should incorporate the right to property.
Suppose that people live in a pre-political situation, and they have the greatest 
possible liberty to gain and improve their own interests in their lives. But there will 
also be the greatest possibility of conflicts among these individuals, who violated one 
another* s interests for their own private convenience. Therefore, rules and institutions 
designed “ to lay down the proper duties and power of owners will be accepted 
happily by any rational, self-interested person in that state. For this reason, we need to 
set up rules and institutions which grant that all people have equal right, under rules 
and institutions, to own property as they may, and remove the liberty to interfere with 
one another in various areas, in order to allow us to live more securely and more 
contentedly. In this course, there is no need to apply to any natural or essential right 
to property. The whole point of establishing and conferring such a right under rules 
and institutions is for the sake of maximizing the general welfare and minimizing the 
possibility of chaos in society. A society which is concerned with the proper range of 
people? s rights of ownership and imposes the appropriate restrictions upon others 
behavior that correspond to the range of freedom will be better off than not. Therefore, 
if the institutions are justified on utilitarian grounds, the right to property and the 
correlative duty will be conferred under it on the same grounds.
There is one more thing, I think, that needs to be said about this account of the right to 
property on utilitarian grounds. In Rawl£ approach, one does not have to argue that 
the institutions establish the right to property because when people exercise their 
property rights, it will be most likely to maximize human welfare, nor to think that a 
person is fully justified in exercising his right to property only if his exercise can 
promote the maximizing of human welfare. People are not required to worry generally
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about the utility of their actions. Rawls seeks to accommodate rights and duties under 
institutions that establish rules and institutions can be defended on utilitarian grounds, 
that is, as useful, well-ordered social institutions which benefit human beings. Rawls’ 
approach is “ to apply the utilitarian principle to the institution which is to authorize 
particular action^’ , and, therefore, to set up rules and institutions that people will be 
happy to accept, because their lives will be better off if they live under it.
2.3 Punishment, Right and Utilitarianism
As I mentioned before, it seems to be necessary to know whether the utilitarian has 
the capability of accommodating human rights or not, then we may discuss whether 
this theory can be used to argue for a way out of the paradox of punishment in regard 
to human rights. According to our analysis of Rawls’ indirect-utilitarian approach, it 
seems that human rights can be accounted in the terms of utilitarianism, and 
punishment as well. Now the criticism of his argument is that the punishment of 
innocent persons will be allowed in a utilitarian society. The measure of criminality 
might be“ the damage done to the natioii’ , or“ the seriousness of crimes more by the 
rank of the injured party than by their significance for the public good’37. According 
to the principle of utility, the measurement of criminality must be based upon the 
welfare that is damaged by the criminal. However, M. M. Mackenzie has given us a 
good example of the criticism of the measuring. According to their suspicion, the 
principle of utility does not legislate against the following possibilities38:
1. A has committed no crime at all. Nevertheless, it is thought that his punishment 
may have a deterrent effect, perhaps because others think that he has committed the 
crime. On strict utilitarian lines, therefore, the general good is to be served by his 
being punished; so he is punished.
2. B is a recidivist who has committed crimes, but not this one. Nevertheless, 
perhaps for preventive reasons, it is thought useful to punish B for this crime; so he 
is punished.
3. C actually committed this crime. He is only partly responsible for it because he
37 Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, R. Bellamy (ed) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p22.
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was coerced. Yet punishment may still deter him from repeating the offence (next 
time, for example, he may offer greater resistance to coercion); therefore he is 
responsible in the instrumental sense. Again, utility demand that he be punished; so 
he is punished.
In these tree cases, A, B and C are all punished improperly and unjustly. But, from 
Rawls’ point of view, these cases might be avoided. In Rawls’ reply to the objection 
that utilitarianism allows the punishment of innocent persons, for example, it is 
mentioned that what people doubt is that “ whether the utilitarian, in justifying 
punishment, hasrf t used arguments which commit him to accepting the infliction of 
suffering on innocent persons if it is for the good of society.” 39 Moreover, it is the 
question of whether “ the utilitarian is committed in principle to accepting many 
practices which he, as a morally sensitive person, wouldii t want to accept?’40 (This is 
the very doubt of the utilitarian account of rights, too.) To stop such a doubt, Rawls 
states utilitarianism in a way which accounts for the distinction between the 
justification of an institution and the justification of a particular action falling under it. 
The institutions are constituted by the general system of rules, and rules are justified 
in terms of the principle of utility. If the justified rules to establish the rule of law, 
which provides the definition of violation and punishment, then institutions of 
punishment are established according to the due process of law. Once one sees that 
the hazard in setting up institutions of punishment are very great, he will ask himself 
whether or not it is likely that having this institution would be for the benefit of 
society in the long run. “ One must not content oneself with the vague thought that, 
when if s a question of this case, it would be a good thing if somebody did something 
even if an innocent person were to suffer.” 41 Therefore, “ if one is careful to apply the 
utilitarian principle to the institution which is to authorize particular actions, then 
there is less danger of its justifying too much’42 and the official in this system who 
understands the utilitarian justification of the rules that he is charged with 
administering would persevere in the rules.
38 M. M. Mackenzie, Plato on punishment (Califormia: University of Califormia Press, 1981), p. 43.
39 J. Rawls, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
40 J. Rawls, op. cit., p 150.
41 J. Rawls, op. cit., p 151.
42 J. Rawls, op. cit., pp. 152-153.
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As I mentioned before, in Rawl£ approach, a utilitarian would accept institutions that 
are justified on utilitarian grounds. Institutions are justified if they promote human 
welfare. Social rules and institutions that are supported by the utilitarian principles 
will require decisions in particular cases, that is, the practice conception of rules. 
Therefore, institutions of punishment also ought to be designed so that people or 
officials as well as private decisions will by and large promote such a value to the 
extent that this can be contrived. Therefore, the whole legal system would not allow 
any person or any official in such a system to have a power to violate an innocent 
persoif s rights whenever it is thought to promote the benefit of social welfare, the 
basic principle of rules is still the same: “ the practice conception of rules, rules are not 
generalizations from the decisions of individuals applying the utilitarian principle 
directly and independently to recurrent particular cases.” 43 Rules define a practice of 
punishment, and they are liable to the utilitarian principle, and actions and decisions 
of punitive institutions in particular cases of punishment are justified under it.44 
Therefore, punitive institutions and laws which are established on utilitarian grounds, 
in theory, will avoid the problem of punishing innocents.
2.4 Criticism of the Utilitarian Argument
According to the institutional utilitarianism argument, as we mentioned, there is no 
doubt that rights could and should be incorporated in utilitarian institutions. The 
society which is concerned with the proper range of peopld s rights and willing to 
impose the appropriate restrictions upon others behavior will have the greatest 
possibility of maximizing the general welfare. Therefore, rules and institutions 
justified on utilitarian grounds are capable of conferring certain rights. Critics of 
utilitarianism do not claim that utilitarian rules and institutions cannot accommodate 
any rights in their system. But they may claim that such institutions may occasionally 
violate or ignore such rights in order to pursue utility. One of the traditional views of 
these critics may be found in the issue of the justification of punishment, especially of 
the punishment of innocents. The critics may ask: might it be true that utilitarian
43 J. Rawls, op. cit, pl63.
44 J. Rawls, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
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institutions recommend the punishment of innocent people (who have not done 
anything against the rules or the law) on the grounds of utility? Is it possible that the 
utilitarian argument may justify too much, that is, it may justify the conditional 
violation of innocent person^ rights for the sake of general welfare?
The institutional utilitarian theorist has worked hard to deny this doubt, as we 
mentioned before, and a good example is Rawls’ reply. In his reply to the objection 
that utilitarianism allows the punishment of innocent persons, Rawls states 
utilitarianism in a way which accounts for the distinction between the justification of 
an institution and the justification of a particular action falling under it. These 
distinctions in levels of justification, as A. H. Goldman argues in his4 The Paradox of 
Punishment , are44 matters of degree, since when justifying an institution, one must 
consider acts within it; and when justifying legislative decisions, one must consider 
their applications in the judicial system.” 45 According to Rawls’ reply, we may save 
the innocent people from being punished by applying the utilitarian principle to the 
institution directly. The institutions of punishment, as we can imagine, would and 
should confer that people have certain legal rights in the trial process, such as the right 
to silence, rights of cross-examination, so that the innocent people may defend 
themselves from being punished. If we also establish the safeguards against 
conviction under trial procedures as well, such as the requirement of evidence needed 
for conviction, provision for legal representation, then the possibility of innocent 
people being convicted may be reduced in particular cases under the legal system. 
Utilitarian institutions, therefore, will not recommend the punishment of innocent 
people under it on the grounds of utility, and, on the contrary, they will defend 
innocent people from being punished for the sake of general welfare.
But critics of the institutional utilitarian still may say that even under Rawls’ system 
which conferred certain rights under the process of law on the innocent people, it still 
may be possible for the institutions to consider the utilitarian suggestion that, 
44 perhaps even primarily in order to save the innocent lives of victims of crime, we 
should simply reduce the safeguards for conviction under normal trial procedures (so
45 A. H. Goldman, ‘ The Paradox of Punishment , in A  J. Simmons, M. Cohen, J. Cohen, and C. R. 
Beitz(ed.) Punishment (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p30.
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that fewer guilty criminals will get away)” 46 In fact, as S. Smilansky mentioned, the 
current Western procedures of law face such a strong requirement. The argument may 
work like this47:
1. Assuming the utility of punishment, the general welfare of the whole society will 
be maximized if fewer criminals could escape from conviction and punishment in 
the legal system.
2. If we can insure that fewer criminals could escape from punishment, this is not to 
say that any official or authority in the system may have power to violate person^ 
rights whenever it is thought for the benefit of social welfare in particular cases.
3. It is obvious that fewer criminals will go unpunished if we relax the rules of 
punishment by simply reducing the safeguards against conviction under normal 
trial procedures.
4. There is no need to diminish the general respect for the rules and institutions of 
punishment, and it is possible for most innocent people that they would still not be 
at risk of being punished.
5. Therefore, though more innocent people are likely to be punished under such a 
legal system, the damage is negligible if compared to peopld s chance of being 
harmed (including the punished innocents) by the unpunished criminals, and 
compared with the damage to the whole society if more guilty persons may go 
unpunished.
Now we can see that this kind of critic of institutional utilitarian, as S. Smilansky 
mentioned, may say that even under the utilitarian institutions which conferred certain 
rights under the process of law on the innocent people, it still may be possible for the 
institutions to consider the utilitarian suggestion that,“ perhaps even primarily in order 
to save the innocent lives of victims of crime, we should simply reduce the safeguards 
for conviction under normal trial procedures (so that fewer guilty criminals will get 
away).” 48 Assuming the utility of punishment, the general welfare of the whole society 
will be maximized if fewer criminals could escape from conviction and punishment in
46 S. Smilansky, ‘ Utilitarianism and The ‘ Punishment of The Innocent: The General Probleni , the 
Analysis (vol. 50, 1990), p258.
47 S. Smilansky, ibid., p259.
48 S. Smilansky1, ibid., p258.
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the legal system and that is not to say that any official or authority in the system may 
have power to violate person^ rights whenever it is thought for the benefit of social 
welfare in particular cases. All we have to do is to relax the rules of punishment by 
simply reducing the safeguards for conviction under normal trial procedures, then 
fewer criminals will go unpunished. Most innocent people would not be at the risk of 
being punished. It means, however, more innocent people are likely to be punished 
under such a legal system. But this damage is negligible if in comparison with the 
overall utility gains.
This is a dangerous argument for the institutional utilitarian, for utilitarianism of this 
kind in general depends on applying the utilitarian principle to the institution, and this 
argument shows that a legal institution, which conditionally allows the punishment of 
innocent persons, may not be against the principle of utility. Furthermore, in terms of 
a utilitarian argument, there is nothing inherently wrong in the punishment of any 
innocent people. According to his analysis, a legal institution which allows the 
innocent person to be punished could still confer certain rights on them under legal 
procedures. It is not to say that such a system cannot give any argumentative 
threshold of peopld s rights, nor to claim that innocent people who walk on the street 
may be framed for no reason but utility. What it emphasizes is that, even when one is 
careful to apply the utilitarian principle to the institution which is to authorize 
particular actions, there is a danger of its justifying too much. This will happen when 
we seek to reduce, not to withdraw, the threshold of conviction and the safeguards of 
innocent person^ rights in the judicial system, so that more criminals will be 
punished. If it will be beneficial in utilitarian terms, then it may turn out to be 
justifiable in utilitarian terms. If so, that is what ought to be done. This is the 
conclusion that the institutional utilitarian must draw, thought they may not want to do 
so.
The point, as J. Wolff argues, “ is not that it is better to punish the innocent; surely it 
would be better still on the utilitarian calculus to fine and punish the guilty. But when 
everything is taken into account it seems quite likely that some miscarriages of justice 
are defensible in utilitarian terms” 49 How can the institutional utilitarian avoid such a
49 J. Wolff, An Introduction to political philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p58.
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problem? There is a real case, however, that shows the damage of punishing innocents 
to the whole institutions and rules is not negligible in utilitarian terms, as S. 
Smilansky claims above. That is the case of the “ Birmingham Sitf in the U. K, who 
“ had been found guilty of murder, but claimed that their confessions had been beaten 
out of them by police_ that the confessions were involuntary and were improperly 
admitted in evidence and that the convictions were erroneous” 50 Even so, they should 
still remain in jail for utilitarian reasons, according to Lord Denning s comments. 
Unfortunately, this error of judgement has diminished the general respect for the rules 
and institutions of punishment, and, worse, more people, guilty or not, may claim that 
their confessions are“ involuntary and are improperly admitted in evidencd’ . Since the 
general respect and trust for the legal institutions of punishment have been diminished, 
more guilty persons who make the same claim may be believed to be innocent by 
juries and the public, so they are more likely to go unpunished during the trail 
procedures. Therefore, general insecurity will be the consequence of the punishment 
of innocents if the public realize what is going on. The consequences of Smilansky s 
judicial system will go against the principle of utility, the institutional utilitarian may 
reply, and, therefore, “ one must describe more carefully what the institution is which 
his example suggests, and then ask oneself whether or not it is likely that having this 
institution would be for the benefit of society in the long run.” 51
To sum up, the reason why a utilitarian argument concerning punishment will cause 
us to doubt the legitimacy of victimization, that is, let innocents be punished in the 
legal system on the ground of utility, is this: if the existence of punishment in our 
society is simply in order to maximize welfare, then “ there is nothing to prevent 
serious cases of victimization of the innocent or exploitation of the guilty” 52 Though 
the imposition of suffering on a guilty person (or who is believed to be guilty) will 
satisfy our feelings of justice, and, by witnessing the suffering, some potential 
criminals might be deterred, the punishment of innocents or exploitation of the guilty 
(if we knew) would still go against our other feelings of justice, and definitely cause 
the violation of rights. No doubt such kind of punishment is morally wrong, and a 
punitive institution which allowed victimization and exploitation for reasons of
50 J. Wolff, ibid., p. 58.
51 J. Rawls, op. cit., pl51.
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welfare will damage the whole society in the long run. The utilitarian agrees that there 
might be no punitive institution that can exclude all possibility of punishment of 
innocents, and once it happens, it must be harmful overall (that will be disutility). But 
if  there are some limitations of the use of punishment, the possibility may be reduced, 
even will not take place any more. The utilitarian insists such limitations must be 
based upon the priority of utility, the right usage of the principle of utility, and the 
right calculation of utility in the long run. Therefore, utility forbids the punishment of 
innocents or, at least, utilitarian punitive institutions will not necessarily produce this 
result.
However, though the punishment of innocents, after we calculate its disutility, might 
be forbidden by the principle of utility, the criticism still suggest that there seems to 
be no good reason why utilitarian institutions will necessarily produce such a result. 
The institutions which will protect innocents from punishment and guilty persons 
from exploitation,, such protection might not maximize the general welfare. There is 
another problem that needs to be solved in particular cases in discussing the paradox 
of punishment, that is, the problem of justifying the punishment of a guilty person 
without facing the criticism that rights are violated. Now that we knew this argument 
is capable of justifying moral and legal rights, and is also able to justify practices of 
punishment with a threshold against the possibility of punishing the innocent, we can 
still ask whether utilitarian argument can justify the punishment of wrongdoers 
without violating their rights? I think the answer could be “ ye£’ . In a utilitarian 
society, we may imagine, that the institutions which protect peopld s rights will do so 
effectively by establishing rules which define peopld s correlative duties to respect 
each othef s rights, and justify the punishment to rights-offenders. According to the 
principle of utility, the institutions will improve the welfare in the long run if it does 
so. It is also reasonable to think that the justification of punishment must be based 
upon the offendef s legal liability to be punished, and the way to justify such 
liabilities can be prescribed in the definition of rights and duties in rules. Briefly 
speaking, definitions of rights in terms of rules are always complex. They should not 
only describe the rights-holdef s liberty of doing certain actions, but also prescribe the 
correlative duties of others to respect such rights, and all right-holder^ legal liability
52 See M. M. Mackenzie, op. cit., p43.
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to punishment if they fails to respect the same rights of other right-holders. Rights 
may not be absolute in law, but punishment must be justified by rules of rights. 
Therefore, take my right to private property for example: the right to private property 
includes anothef s duty to respect it, and the specific provision that those guilty of 
right-offending be punished for it. Suppose you stole my car, then, and were caught 
by the police, you are then fined by punitive institutions. The punishment to you does 
not violate your right to private property, because the rule of private property does not 
say that your property may not be appropriated should you be found guilty of thief. 
Furthermore, my right to private property does not say that the punitive institutions 
should not fine me if I commit the same crime as yours to others. On the contrary, the 
rules of our right to private property prescribe that we are qualified to our rights by 
our liability to be punished if we break the rules. Hence, we may say that punishment 
is justified within the system of rules that constitute rights. The paradox of 
punishment will be dissolved in the detail of the rules.
Now, according to this argument, we may justify punishment with respect to rights, 
and the argument is guided by the principle of utility. But there is an alternative way 
to establish the wrongdoef s liability to punishment, that is, the consent to punishment 
of the wrongdoer. If we may find out that the liability to be punished is consented to 
by the offender himself, then that there is an alternative the principle of utility, as a 
means of dissolving paradox of punishment. So let us turn to look at another famous 
theory of rights, that is, the consent theory, and see how it argues for the justification 
of punishment. Maybe there will be another approach to establishing peopld s liability 
to punishment, which does not lead back to some utilitarian formula as its normative 
outcome.
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SECTION 3 
CONSENT THEORY
As many theorists will agree, traditionally speaking, consent theory is not something 
new in history, and yet it has provided us with a more intuitively appealing account of 
human rights and political obligation than any other historical theories in modem 
political theory. Since the ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, consent argument 
has become an artificial but somehow intuitively convincing explanation for the 
structure of human society and its rules. And“ there is no denying the attractiveness of 
the doctrine of the doctrine of personal consent. _ It has greatly influenced the 
political institutions of many modem states and has been a prime factor in the 
direction political theory has taken since 1600.” 53 One form of this sort of argument is 
the famous contract theory. Briefly speaking, as Hume referred to the ‘ origin 
contract 54 the contract argument tries to establish “ the origin of government on a 
consensual act.” 55 The historical origins of this theory are established by these classic 
contractarians, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. However, I do not intend to analyze or 
trace the origins of the consent theory and contract argument here. But rather I intend 
to examine the argument^ account of human rights and the justification of 
punishment within that theory. Since it is Lockd s thinking that, for the defense of the 
natural rights of men, human beings established nonnatural states and social orders, 
and, therefore, punishment, exists to serve the same function in our society, we can 
also ask whether it may be justified on the same ground as well. I suggest that we 
begin our discussion of punishment in consent theory with Lockd s argument, that is, 
the forfeiture argument.
53 A  J. Simmons, Moral Principle and Political obligation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), p57.
54 D. Hume,‘ Original contract in S. Copley and A  Edgar (ed.) David Hume Selected Essays, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). For the function of the contract argument in political theory, Hume 
writes: “ as no part}; in the present age, can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative 
system of principles annexed to its political or practical one, we accordingly find, that each of the 
factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect 
and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues” p.274.
55 See D. Castiglione,‘ History, Reason and Experience: Hume’ s Arguments against Contract Theories 
in D. Boucher and P. Kelly (ed.) The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, (London: Routledge Press, 
1994), p. 97. But he also mentioned that there are two different pacts of contract argument: “ the main 
conceptual distinction between the establishment of social order and that of government” p. 96.
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3.1 Forfeiture Argument
According to Lockd s natural rights theory, human beings claim certain natural rights, 
that is, they have them qua human beings, and these rights are not established or 
conferred by man-made institutions or rules. People as rights-holders are bound by 
certain moral laws, that is, the law of nature, which define the natural rights of human 
beings and protect these rights as well. The claim rights and moral powers are 
included in the conception of natural rights, especially those relative to the right to 
private property. Locke is clear about the duty correlative to our moral powers and 
claim rights, and, from his point of view, natural law has also defined our duties to 
respect each othef s rights as well. Therefore, if we failed to fulfill our duties to 
respect others rights, these acts will be considered as“ violation^5. According to the 
natural law, if any agent violate some anothef s right, “ the law of nature be observed, 
which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of 
nature is in that state, put into every mans hands, whereby every one has a right to 
punish the transgressor of the laW’56. Another reason for punishment is to deter others 
from doing the like crime, and “ secure men from the attempt of a criminal5. In his 
theory, therefore, people can rightfully punish any wrongdoer, and every other agent 
can legitimately punish him without facing the problem of rights-violations. Beside, 
the consequence of such actions will “ preserve all mankind5. However, punishment 
can only be justified upon this ground, and the right to punish must be exercised, that 
is, in regard to “ the necessity of defending the repository of the public well-being 
from the usurpations of individual^5, as Beccaria says; otherwise “ every act of 
authority between one man and another which is not derived from absolute necessity 
is tyrannous5, and“ everything more than that is no longer justice, but an abusd5 57.
However, the main problem of the forfeiture argument that Locke leaves to us is that: 
we cannot resolve the question of how the criminal forfeits his rights by wrongdoing, 
and, therefore, it will be impossible for us to decide how far the criminal gives up his 
rights. If we cannot solve this main difficulty in the theory, we can hardly imagine, as 
a result, that in a Lockean society people have right to punish any wrongdoer, or that
56 J. Locke, in P. Laslett (ed.) The Second Treatise of Go\>ernment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), IL_7.
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the punitive system has a measure for the proportion between crimes and punishment. 
For this reason, A. H. Goldman attempts to solve this problem in his4 The Paradox of 
Punishmenf . The paradox of punishment he points out is that “ a penal institution 
somewhat similar to that in use in our society seems from a moral point of view to be 
both required and unjustified’58, and this dilemma arises from two 4 intuitively 
plausibld theses: “ one associated with a retributivist point of view and another 
associated with a utilitarian justification of the institution of punishment.” 59 These two 
theses relate to two different aspects of punishment in our society: punishment must 
be deserved and beneficial. The criminal must deserve his punishment, and the whole 
society will be benefited by the existence of the penal institution, as a deterrent for 
further crime. According to his analysis, the retributivist point of view is concerned 
with the amount of punishment in particular cases, that is, the justice done to the 
wrongdoer by the imposition of punishment, and, on the contrary, the utilitarian 
justification of the penal institution is interested in that44 the community benefits from 
a prisonef s role as an example for others60. For Goldman, if we try to convince a 
wrongdoer that he or she is not being treated unjustly in being punished, then the 
retributivist point of view seems to be more plausible than the institutional utilitarian 
thesis, and this is because44 persons normally have rights not to be severely imposed 
upon in order to benefit others. If we are justifiably to ignore these rights, it could 
only be when they have been forfeited or alienated.” 61 Therefore,44 since having rights 
generally entails having duties to honor the same rights of others, it is plausible that 
when these duties are not fulfilled, the rights cease to exist.” 62
Locke uses a similar theory to justify the rightness of punishment. However, is not a 
consequentialist argument. This argument is derived from the changing of moral 
statuses. In this sense, everyone can rightfully punish any invader, because once an 
agent breaks the law of nature, this persori s moral standing is changed, and the moral 
boundaries, which shield his natural rights, become lower or fall away immediately.
57 Beccaria, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
58 A  H. Goldman, op. cit., p30.
59 A  H. Goldman, ibid, p30.
69 A  H. Goldman, ibid, p31.
61 A. H. Goldman, ibid, p31.
62 A. H. Goldman, ibid. p31.
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Every other agent can legitimately treat this person as “ a wild noxious beasf, as a 
consequence of the wrongdoing has been to put the wrongdoer into a position of 
liability to punishment. Because of the changing of the wrongdoef s moral status, that 
is, the forfeiture of his rights, the violator is liable to punishment, and every other 
agent can legitimately punish him without facing the problem of rights-violations. 
This forfeiture theory seems to give us an idea that the justification of punishment can 
partly rely on the forfeiture of any transgressof s human rights. At first sight, this 
seems quite acceptable to our intuition^ judgement. It seems to explain the reason 
why the punishment of any law-breaker cannot be taken as rights-violations. However, 
the argument of forfeiture in Lockd s and Goldmari s theses does not tell us how the 
criminal forfeits his human rights, which rights he gives up, and why the violation of 
others rights causes the violator to lose his own. The connection between 
wrongdoing and forfeiture is still a mystery.
Suppose that one day I broke into my neighbof s house and stole his money. There is 
no doubt that my neighbof s right of private property was violated by me, and no one 
would object to my liability to punishment after I have committed my crime. Now, the 
punitive institutions decided to send me to prison for five years and fine me $5000. If 
I dare to complain of injustice done to me by the imposition of punishment, according 
to the forfeiture argument, the answer to my objection might be that, by violating the 
rights of others in my offence, I have lost my moral rights that I formerly held, that is 
to say, the moral boundaries, which shield my natural rights, become lower or fall 
away immediately. Therefore, according to the change in my moral status, every other 
agent can legitimately punish me without facing the problem of rights-violations.
But from here the question arises. Suppose that I still insist that the imposition of 
punishment is unjust because I raise doubts about how my moral status has changed, 
that is, how my rights are forfeited, and, furthermore, which right I am supposed give 
up. The first question will be connected to the problem of the4 first persoii and4 the 
third party in the forfeiture theory. In Lockd s argument, unfortunately, it is not clear 
how the offender forfeits his rights; it seems naturally to have happened after the 
offender violated anothef s rights. But it is hard to believe that I, as an offender, will 
be convinced by this reason. Generally speaking, to say that someone? s rights are 
forfeit means that either this person agrees that, under some conditions, if he didrf t
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fulfill certain duties, then some of his rights cease to exist, or, simply, a third party 
asserts that this persorf s rights are deprived. In some cases, forfeiture these two 
respects may happen at the same time. Suppose that I am playing a game with my 
friends, and any one who wants to join this game must adopt certain rules. These rules 
prescribe that under some conditions, if the player fails to fulfill the rules, he or she 
will forfeit some of his or her rights in this game. Every player knows these rules in 
advance, and any one who decides to join the game will be considered to have 
accepted the rules o f  forfeiture . Therefore, if any one fails in this game, we may say 
his rights in this game are forfeited on both the first person account (because the 
player agrees with these rules of forfeiture in this game) and on the third party 
account (the other players apply the rules).
In the case of punishment, however, the problem is different. In the view o f  the first 
persori , if I try to avoid my liability to punishment, all I have to do is disavow, and 
that is enough to protest against the claim that I am liable to be punished because I 
agree to give up my rights if I fail to respect others’ rights. It is not like a game in that 
I knew the rules in advance, and my situation can be taken as an agreement to the 
forfeiture of my rights or my liability to punishment. It is hard to prove that I have 
agreed to any law or rule of forfeiture before I become a member of my society. If I 
say I did not forfeit my rights, then no one can say that I did. In the statement of a 
4 third party , the problem is more obvious: it is lack of grounds. My rights, in this 
sense, are forfeited because44 they (the punitive institution, the law, or, to sum up, the 
third party) say sc?’ . After I have violated my neighbof s rights, I know that, according 
to the law, I am liable to punishment, and if I question people how they can punish me 
without facing the problem of rights-violations, they might say that because I have 
lost my moral rights that I formerly held by violating the rights of others in my 
offence, that is, the forfeiture. And if I question how my rights are forfeited, the 
answer will be like this: the law, the punitive institution, that is, the third party has 
decided that every offender will lose his or her rights by violating othef s rights. This 
answer is no different than saying that I am liable to be punished by the third party 
because the third party asserts that I am liable to be punished. The fault of this 
argument is4 begging the questiorf . Therefore, neither of these two arguments seems 
to be able to convince me that my liability to punishment is justified on the ground of 
forfeiture.
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To resolve this problem of the forfeiture argument, there is another solution which 
tries to establish an argument for the offendef s agreement to his or her liability to 
punishment. The resolution focuses our attention on the problem o r  the first persorf 
in forfeiture argument. If we can prove that the offender does voluntarily consent to 
his liability to punishment after he violated another’ s rights, then the problem is 
solved, and this kind of resolution will lead us to another argument concerning human 
rights: the consent theory.
3.2 Consent Theory
Now we are going to examine another argument for the justification of punishment in 
rights theories. It is the argument of consent theory. As a theory of rights, basically, 
consent theory is concerned with the legitimization of political obligation. Consent 
theorists try hard to establish a foundation for political obligation which is based upon 
the voluntary agreement of citizens. Punishment, which is also considered as a burden 
to people, though it cannot be taken as a branch of political obligation, can perhaps be 
explained on the same ground. The reason is like this: punishment is a manmade 
burden on the citizen for the protection of the whole society. If we can establish its 
foundation upon the voluntary agreement of citizens, then the problem of its 
justification is solved. Citizens consent to their liability to punishment voluntarily for 
their own benefits. Therefore, the argument for the justification of punishment can be 
similar to the argument for the legitimization of political authority; therefore, it is 
plausible to examine the consent theory s argument and see if its form can be used for 
the justification of punishment.
The consent theory is based on the belief that the legitimization of any political 
authority and obligations correlative to it must be justified by its citizen^ voluntary 
agreement, that is, the political authority and obligation of its people are founded 
upon their individual performance of a voluntary act. In this theory, every citizen is 
considered as a rational agent, who can make decisions for themselves, understand 
their actions and take responsibility for the consequences. Therefore, they can freely 
decide, according to their wills and benefits, to establish political institutions and
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rules among them by promises, contracts, or express or tacit consent. According to the 
theory, rules and institutions arise from peopld s consent. Man is not bound to a 
particular political institution until he voluntarily chooses to be. I shall be considering 
whether an argument of similar structure could be used to defend punishment. In 
respect of‘ consent , it is said that there are varieties of consent theory, and there are 
four features of them:63
1. Human beings have certain rights qua their humanity, and these rights are not the 
product of other voluntary acts of the right-holder, nor do they arise from any 
consent, contract or promises. They are our rights to act and choose within the 
limits of moral law without interference from others. According to this feature, the 
consent theory contends that“ our political bonds must be freely assumed.” 64
2. “ Man gives up his natural freedom (and is bound by obligations) only by 
voluntarily giving a “ clear sigif that he desires to do so.” 65 That is to say, though 
there are many kinds of consent, express or tacit, that can be used to legitimate the 
political authority and obligations, all of them “ must be deliberate undertakings, 
sufficient to indicate clearly that the actor has freely given up his natural freedom 
with respect to the specified actions and parties.” 66 Therefore, man does not really 
lose any freedom of action to begin with, because he“ makes the govemmenf s acts 
his own.” 67
3. In consent theory, no one may decide what is in the interest of another agent, and 
it claims that no citizen is“ to be automatically bound at birth to any state” 68It is 
via peopld s voluntarily acts of consent that the political authority and obligation 
are legitimated. Therefore, “ the method of consent protects the citizen from injury 
by the state” 69
63 A  J. Simmons, Moral Principle and Political obligation, p62-70.
64 A  J. Simmons, ibid. p64.
65 A  J. Simmons, ibid p64.
66 A  J. Simmons, ibid. p65.
67 A. J. Simmons, ibid p65.
68 A. J. Simmons, ibid p68.
69 A. J. Simmons, ibid p.65.
33
4. Since the authority of any political institutions arises from the consent of its 
citizens, and they consent to it willingly for their own benefits, and none of them 
can be free to decide what is good for any other agents, the method of consent 
“ protects the individual from becoming bound to any government which he finds 
unpalatabld’70. That is also to say, “ The state is an instrument for serving the 
interests of its citizens” 71
According to these four features, on the one hand, any political authority and 
correlative obligations are legitimated only if it is established via people’ s consent, 
and, on the other, the theory also tell us that people’ s obedience to rules and 
institutions is justified if it arises as the consequence of their consent. No one can 
reasonably blame others for things which are done to us with our agreement; therefore, 
we cannot complain of our liability to political obligation, because that is confirmed 
by our consent. As Simmons mentions, “ Consent theory respects our belief that the 
course a mari s life takes should be determined, as much as possible, by his own 
decisions and actions.” 72
Before we turn to use the same argument for the justification of punishment, there is 
one interpretation o f  voluntarily consent . According to the consent theory account of 
political obligation, J. Rawls suggest that“ acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly 
unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations,” 73 and that “ obligatory ties 
presuppose just institutions.” 74 This is because any extorted promises are invalid, and 
“ unjust social arrangement are themselves a kind of extortiori’ ; therefore/4 consent to 
them does not bind.” This argument sounds plausible to our intuitive judgement, 
however, as A. J. Simmons argues, an unjust social institution might harm innocents, 
but it does not follow that one cannot voluntarily consent to it. “ Supposing only that 
the unjust institution does not happen to be doing violence to me, I can freely consent
70 A  J. Simmons, ibid. p69.
71 A. J. Simmons, ibid. p.68.
72 A  J. Simmons, ibid. p69.
73 J. Rawls, A Theory> of Justice, p343.
74 J. Rawls, ibid., pi 12.
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to its authority.” 75 Hence, an unjust institution or unfair law does not presuppose that it 
cannot be voluntarily consented to by the citizen, though consenting to it, it might be 
a wrong decision.
Now we may turn to the justification of punishment. If we clarify the form of the 
consent theory, then we can see how the same argument can be used for the 
justification of punishment:
1. Human beings have certain rights qua their humanity, and these rights are not the 
product of other voluntary acts of the right-holder, nor do they arise from any 
consent, contract or promises. They are our rights to act and choose within the 
limits of moral law without interference from others. Since the means which 
punishment may use against offenders might violate their human rights; the 
consent theory contends, therefore, that our liability to punishment must be freely 
assumed.
2. According to the second feature of consent theory, “ Man gives up his natural 
freedom (and is bound by obligations) only by voluntarily giving a “ clear sigrf 
that he desires to do so.” 76 Hence, no matter what kinds of consent, express or tacit, 
that can be used to legitimate our liability to punishment and the punitive 
institutions, all of them must be“ deliberate undertaking^’ by its citizen, including 
those offenders. It is “ sufficient to indicate clearly that the actor has freely given 
up his natural freedom with respect to the specified actions and parties.” 77 
Therefore, as we mentioned before, every citizen does not really lose any right or 
freedom, because he makes his liability to punishment by himself.
3. In consent theory, though no one may decide what is in the interest of another 
agent, and it claims that no citizen is “ to be automatically bound at birth to any 
statd’78, it is via peopld s voluntarily acts of consent that obligation and 
punishment are legitimated. Therefore, the method of consent does not only 
protect the citizen from injury by the state, but also protects them from the misuse
75 J. Rawls, ibid., p78.
76 J. Rawls, ibid. p64.
77 J. Rawls, ibid. p65.
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and abuse of punishment.
4. If the authority of any political obligation, which is considered as a manmade 
burden on human beings, arises from the consent of its citizens, and they consent 
to it willingly for their own benefits, and none of them can be free to decide what 
is good for any other agents, then punishment can arise from the same ground. 
Now the method of consent, in the case of punishment, can be used to protect the 
individual from becoming bound to any punitive system which he finds 
unacceptable. Further more, in this sense, punishment can also be considered as an 
instrument for serving the interests of every member in our society.
The form of the whole argument of this theory seems to be sound so far, and the 
conclusion is acceptable to our intuitions. But the question arises: the argument would 
be true only if the premise is true. If the premise is false, then the theory would 
collapse. Worse, if there is no evidence to show that we do consent, expressly or 
tacitly, to our political obligation or liability to punishment, then, on the one hand, we 
dori t have any obligation or liability at all, and on the other, none of our political 
authorities, institutions, legal system are legitimated (according to the consent 
argument). That is to say, if we are not forced to live under a non-legitimated 
government, then we should live in the state of anarchy. Since we can never tell that 
someone consents or not unless he admits that he did, the political obligation or 
liability to punishment of any citizen will be invalid if he or she sincerely disavows 
these. This is the problem that C: S. Nino wants to solve in his consent argument; 
therefore, let us turn to Nind s argument and see how it works.
3.3 Nino and Consent Theory
In Nind s thinking, the practical meaning of consent is quite controversial, especially 
“ among the jurist^’79. The concept of4 consent is not a term that only has moral and 
political meanings, but also finds application in the area of law. Instead of discussing 
all the details of these debates, he simply gives us some guidelines for what
78 J. Rawls, ibid. p68.
79 C. S. Nino,‘ A Consensual Theory of Punishment ,in Philosophy and Public affairs, 12,1983.
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constitutes consent.
In his view, if we claim that someone has consented to the assumption of some duties 
or obligations, it does not follow that this agent has actually signed or made a 
statement such as ‘ I consent to X . That is just a special kind of consent, express 
consent, to use Lockd s term, and it is familiar from the detail of specific contracts. 
The consent can also be shown by someond s‘ voluntary acf , that is, “ the consent of 
the individual to some duty or responsibility is shown by the performance of any 
voluntary act with the knowledge that the act has as a necessary consequence the 
assumption of the duty or responsibility in questioif80. The word4 knowledgd does 
not imply that the agent must know the whole consequence of his act, nor does it 
mean that the agent has to have the precise knowledge of legal rules which might be 
correlative to his act and its consequences. It is knowledge that “ must include, in 
particular, awareness of the obligations or liabilities he is assuming with his act.” 81 
Therefore, 44 a person consents to all the consequences that he knows are necessary 
effects of his voluntary acf’82, and 44 the person who voluntarily performs an act 
knowing that it has the undertaking of certain obligations as a necessary consequence 
consents to undertake those obligations.” 83 Consent, for this reason, is a voluntary act 
that has legal normative consequences, and“ when that particular legal consequence of 
the voluntary act is known by the agent, we may say that he has consented to it” 84 
This is the very beginning of his further discussion on 4 the consent theory of 
punishment .
The justification of punishment, as Nino mentioned, might be very similar to the 
justification of political obligations. For, since4 punishment is one species of the large 
family of measures involving intentional deprivation of a persori s normally 
recognized rights by official institutions, using coercive means if necessary , the 
justification of punishment will involve the justification of political obligation and 
political authority in any rights theory. Hence, if we look at the case of punishment,4 it
80 C. S. Nino, ibid p294.
81 C. S. Nino, ibid p295.
82 C. S. Nino, ibid p295.
s:' C. S. Nino, ibid p295.
8“ C. S. Nino, ibid p296.
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is easy to find analogies with the cases mentioned above’ It is the case of offender^ 
consent to assume a liability to punishment.
According to Nind s analysis, “ a necessary legal consequence of committing an 
offense is the loss of immunity from punishment that person previously enjoyed’ , and 
the loss of immunity is obviously correlative to the legal power on the part of certain 
public officials to punish the offender.’ This is a description of the normative legal 
situation, in terms of consequences to the offender of committing an offence. This 
description sounds very similar to the Lockean theory of punishment. According to 
that theory, after committing an offense, the offender* forfeit^ his rights, forgoes his 
immunity, lowers his moral boundaries, and, therefore, is liable to punishment. For 
these reasons, the punishment to the offender cannot be considered as a violation of 
the offender* s human rights, because the offender has lesser rights or no rights at all. 
But it would be a mistake to interpret Nind s description in this way. It is the concept 
of ‘ consenf , not * forfeif that gives a moral justification for punishment in his 
argument.
In Nind s view, “ the fact that the offender loses his legal immunity from punishment 
does not imply that he also loses the moral immunity deriving from the principle that 
it is prima facie wrong to sacrifice an individual for the benefit of others.” Therefore, 
we need an argument that is“ grounded on something more that the mere fact that the 
law gives officials the power of punishment.” One of the possible ways is to ground 
the offendef s liability to punishment on his consent, that is, “ a person consents to all 
the consequences that he knows are necessary effects of his voluntary acf’85, and“ the 
person who voluntarily performs an act knowing that it has the undertaking of certain 
obligations as a necessary consequence consents to undertake those obligations.” If an 
offender commits any offence voluntarily, and knowing that it has necessary effects as 
the consequence, then once he commits the offence, he consents to all the 
consequences “ that he knows are necessary effects of his voluntary acf’ , and 
punishment, too. This argument can be simplified as follows:
1. X is an offence.
85 C. S. Nino, ibid p295.
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2. Any one who commits X will be liable to punishment as the necessary 
consequence
3. I know that any one who commits X will be liable to punishment as the necessary 
consequence.
4. I commit X  voluntarily, knowing it to be an offence.
5. Therefore, I have consented to my liability to punishment, because I do it 
voluntarily, in full knowledge of its necessary consequences.
According to his argument, we may say that the criminal has consented to assume a 
liability to punishment after committing the crime. In this approach, Nino may avoid 
the problem of the acknowledgement of consent in consent theory. If a person 
performs a voluntary act such as offence, and knows the necessary consequence of 
that act, then he or she does consent to the duty or obligation as the necessary 
consequences of his or her act. The consequences which possibly follow from the act, 
in this sense, may be used to justify the assertion that the agent has consented to them. 
Therefore, though the offender may claim that he disavows his consent to his liability 
to punishment, his voluntary act has justified that he does consent to it. As Nino 
mentioned, “ this consent to assume a legal liability to suffer punishment is, as in the 
case of contracts and in the voluntary assumption of a risk, an irrevocable one, and it 
is independent of the attitude of the agent toward the event which is the object of the 
normative characterization.”
3.4 Criticism of Consent Argument
Nind s argument seems to be plausible so far. As we mentioned before, generally 
speaking, no one can reasonably blame others for things which are done to us with our 
agreement; therefore, if we can say that the offender performs a voluntary act which is 
an offence, and knows the necessary consequence of that act in law, then he or she 
does consent to their liability to punishment as the necessary consequences of his or 
her act. But there is one question that arises here: how can we be sure that any agent 
who performs a voluntary act, with the full knowledge of its necessary consequences, 
has consented to all the things that are done to him as the necessary consequences? 
How can we be sure that the consent is an irrevocable one, “ independent of the
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attitude of the agent toward the event which is the object of the normative 
characterizatiorP , especially if this agent thinks his legal liability to suffer punishment, 
as the necessary consequence from his “ voluntary assumption of a risk5, is totally 
wrong?
Suppose that, according to the law, every one who wants to emigrate to another 
country should give up his right to private property, and be questioned everyday by 
policemen before he leaves his country; if anyone disobeys this law, they will be 
liable to punishment. If I want to emigrate from this country, and I know precisely 
what the law says, though I think the law is wrong, I still might obey it voluntarily. 
But in this case, it is hard to say that my voluntary act can account for my consent to 
the law. The reason for my voluntary obedience is based upon the consideration of my 
benefits, not on my agreement to the law. I may voluntarily obey the law that I do not 
agree with, and if I do not agree with it, then I do not consent to it. In this sense, my 
legal liability to punishment is the necessary consequence for my disobedience, 
according to the law, and if I am brave enough to disobey the law voluntarily, I know 
the necessary consequence of my offence, but my voluntary act is not sufficient 
enough to claim that I do consent to my legal liability to punishment. Therefore, it is 
difficult for Nino to convince us that our consent is justified by our voluntary acts, 
and independent of the attitude of the agent toward his legal liability to punishment.
Some people might argue that, according to Nine? s argument, no matter whether the 
law is just or not, since it prescribes our legal liability to punishment, we have 
consented to it. Their argument goes like this: the law is made by the political 
authority, that is, the government, and no government is legitimate until it is 
legitimated via our consent, express or tacit; hence, when we consent to the 
legitimization of the government, we know that this government would have several 
kinds of power over us, and one of them is the power to make law and make it work 
through the prescriptions of penal system. Once we voluntarily consent to the 
legitimization of government, we have consented to our obligations and obedience 
under its governing at the same time. Therefore, we have consented to our legal 
liability to punishment as the necessary consequence in law of disobedience, because 
of our consent to the legitimization of the government, that is, the sovereign 
lawmaker.
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The objection to this argument is very simple: the consequence arising from this 
argument will be contrary to the basic belief of consent theory. We consent to our 
political obligation and authority for our own benefit, and this method will protect us 
from injury by the state. In this sense, government is considered as an instrument for 
serving the interests of its citizens, and so, too, must be the law; therefore, our consent 
must be a deliberate undertaking. We do not really consent to giving up our freedom 
of action and judgement, that is to say, our consent to the government and its power is 
conditional; if this consent is unconditional and irrevocable, this contract will turn out 
to be contrary to our benefit. For this reason, no one can reasonably assume that since 
we have voluntarily consented to the authority of the government, then we do consent 
to everything the government may do to us as the necessary consequence of our 
consent, even if the government is wrong or acts unjustly to us. We consent to our 
government with limitation and conditions. The consent argument is used to constrain 
the government from the possibility of misuse and abuse of its power, not to justify 
such misuse and abuse.
Hence, if consent, as A. J. Simmons suggests, “ must be given intentionally and 
knowingly’ , and also “ must be given voluntarily’86, then the crucial question for 
Nind s theory is this: how can he convince a criminal that he does consent to his 
liability to punishment through his voluntary act (the offence he commits), and 
forgoes his previously enjoyed immunity in the legal system as a necessary 
consequence of committing an offence? Further more, if the criminal sincerely 
disavows that he consents to any “ necessary consequent’ of his offence, because, 
personally, he disagrees with the law, then how can Nino persuade him that his 
consent is “ independent of the attitude of the agent toward the event which is the 
object of the normative characterizatiori’ ? To answer this question, Nino seems to 
suggest that the offender cannot reasonably reject his liability to punishment on the 
grounds of his disagreement with the law, if the law is justified, and the punitive 
institution is legitimate. That is to say, if the whole penal system is legitimate and just, 
that means the criminal s disavowal to his consent will not be reasonable, because no 
one can reasonably deny or disagree with something that is accepted and agreed by
86 A. J. Simmons. Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p77.
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him when his reason is sound. Therefore, any punishment of his offence which is 
prescribed by the just law and executed by the legitimate institution is consented to by 
the criminal himself, for that is what he ought to consent to.
This reply seems to be plausible at first glace, and leads us to the solution of the 
problem of the criminal s consent to his liability to punishment. No one can deny that 
if it is clear to us that something is just and legitimate, that is to say, something is 
right, then every reasonable agent would come to the same conclusion that such a 
thing ought to be done. And if the law and the punitive institution are just and 
legitimate, then, even if the offender might insist on his disavowal, it seems to be 
reasonable to think that his disavowal worf t cancel the rightness of his liability to the 
punishment, which also ought to be consented by him if his reason is sound. In this 
view, if the law is just, then our consent to our legal liability to punishment which the 
law prescribes is truly justified, independent of our attitude, because it is the right 
thing that we ought to consent to; therefore, we consent to it.
But if we give a second thought to this reply, then we will find the main point of the 
argument is changed. For the consent argument for punishment, the most important 
question is to try to establish the foundation of our legal liability to punishment upon 
our voluntary agreement, that is, our consent. Therefore, if the argument can prove 
that we actually consent to our liability to punishment, then the problem of its 
justification is solved. But now, according to Nine? s suggestion, the most important 
thing for us is to find out whether the law and the punitive institution are just. If the 
law and institutions are just and legitimate, then they should have been consented to 
by us, because we ought to agree with that. The conception off consenf doesii t play 
any major role in the argument any more, and the main point of the argument is the 
justification of the moral rightness of the law. If the law is just, then the problem of 
consent is solved but at a different level: the foundation is effected by the claim that 
punishment is right under the fair laws and just institutions. We dori t need the 
argument for voluntary consent any more. If the whole argument is not based upon the 
conception of actual consent, then it seems to be hard to consider this argument as a 
branch of the consent argument. In fact, the problem and an alternative way that Nino 
leaves to us directs us to another theory which is also concerned with the conception 
of political obligation through the method of consent, not through the method of
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actual consent but through a hypothetical version, that is, the hypothetical consent 
argument.
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SECTION 4 
THE HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACT ARGUMENT AND 
CONSENT THEORY
4.1 Hypothetical Contract Argument
As we mentioned before, though the forfeiture argument for punishment has several 
faults, it seems that the consent theory argument does not make much significant 
progress. Both of them face the some problem: the logic of these arguments is sound, 
and if the premises are true, then the conclusion is plausible; however, the premises 
seem to be implausible in respect of the criminal. For the forfeiture argument, the 
premises are very problematic: how can we assert the criminal has forfeited his or her 
rights after his or her violation of othef s rights, and, therefore, he or she is liable to be 
punished by others? The connection of wrongdoing and forfeiture still is a mystery. In 
Lockd s argument, the change of the offender1 s moral status seems naturally to have 
happened after he committed the offence; for the recent theorist, such as A  H. 
Goldman, the rights of the offender are gone because he or she failed to fulfill the 
duty that is correlative with rights, that is, the duty to honor the same rights of others. 
But neither of them can give us a clear idea of how the forfeiture happens, who are 
entitled to assert that ond s rights are forfeited, and how far the wrongdoer gives up 
his or her rights.
For the consent theory, the problem is quite similar to the weakness of contract 
argument: we cannot prove that there is such a contract or a consent. For the argument, 
once we know what the terms of the contract or consent are, we know what the 
government is obligated to do, and what the people are obliged to obey; hence, if we 
use the same argument for the criminal s liability of punishment, we may say that the 
criminal has consented to his punishment. But here rises the problem: if the premises 
are true, then punishment is justified. But if they are not, then the conclusion follows: 
that no one—neither citizens not government—is bound by the contract. According to
the argument, contracts or consents can establish political obligations or legal liability 
to punishment only if they are actually agreed to. Unfortunately, it seems to be that we 
cannot convince all offenders that they do consent, expressly or tacitly, to their
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liability to punishment through their voluntary offence, especially when they 
disavows that he or she consents to any“ necessary consequent’ of the offence.
To resolve these problems, the alternative way is that we can say that a certain 
agreement is the contract that people ought to sign, that is, the hypothetical contract. 
The hypothetical contract, unlike the contract or consent that people actually agree to, 
is a structure of reason. It is based on the belief that some agreements would be made 
by people for their benefits, if they were rational and look forward to cooperating with 
each other. In this argument, we are not considering any contract or consent which is 
actually agreed to by the citizen, but the appropriate perspective from which contracts 
or consents could be agreed to.
4.2 Dworkin and Hypothetical Contract Argument
When Dworkin discusses hypothetical contract arguments in his book Taking Rights 
Seriously, he notices that, for the hypothetical contract argument, the theorist does not 
suppose that any political institution and its citizens ever actually entered into a 
contract or consent, expressly or tacitly, nor does the argument need a state of nature 
or any sort of pre-political society. Therefore, it would be wrong to take such an 
argument as a simple form of the consent theory. The most famous example that 
Dworkin used to explain how this argument works is J. Rawls’ s idea of the original 
position in his A Theory o f Justice. The original position, in Rawl£ s thinking, is a 
“ hypothetical original positioif, and in this position, there are certain moral 
requirements that “ would be chosen by his (Rawl£ s) contractors from a choice 
situation under conditions of partial ignorance.” 87 He does not suggest that any group 
ever actually enters into a contract as he described in his theory, but he suggests us to 
think in mind what “ would/should be choserf as if we were contractors in such an 
original position. As Dworkin suggests, this idea serves “ not to work out the historical 
origins of society, or the historical obligations of governments and individuals, but to 
model the idea of the moral equality of individuals.” 88 For this reason, the way of 
establishing the hypothetical argument may look like that one tries to build up a
87 A. J. Simmons, op.cit., pl43-144.
88 W. Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1990). p60.
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“ dialogud’ of“ what would1should happen if..” along in his own though. Such kind 
of dialogue does not have to actually happen between more then one person. 
Furthermore, as we can find out in his writing, Rawls uses this idea as a means to 
explain why some agreements or contracts should be agreed to. He argues that if  a 
group of rational men did find themselves in the predicament of the original position, 
then they would contract for some principles. Therefore, “ his contract is hypothetical, 
and hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent argument for the fairness of 
enforcing their terms.” 89 In this sense, Dworkiii s account of the hypothetical contract 
is that it is no contract at all, it is a “ metaphof’ rather then a real contract, for what it 
is suppose to do is to change the thinker to the decision maker (not actually, but only 
in mind) and reason the reasoning of other agents, and that is why it is a powerful 
device to convince people of the proper point of view from which some decisions 
should be taken.
Therefore, as R. Dworkin mentions in his Taking Rights Seriously, “ a hypothetical 
agreement is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is not contract at all’90, 
and the crucial question of this argument is “ what is it about the independent 
arguments that make the contract or consent an appropriate representational device?’91 
For these reasons, the hypothetical contract argument that we use is to establish an 
argumentative device, as Dworkin says, and this argument is not used for justification 
of the ground of contract or consent. Dworkin tries to establish “ the independent 
arguments that make the contract or consent an appropriate representational devicd’ . 
It is an argument from a structure of reason, a method for hypothesizing, and people 
can use it as means when they establish a conclusion which different parties can 
accept and which is found upon the agreement or a contract between agents who are 
involved in. According to the failure of consent theory, the purpose of employing this 
argument is to explain why we can say, of some practice, that people should consent 
to them. This argument can give the way for us to hypothesize that a rational 
contractor would agree to certain rules. Dworkin has given out an example of how 
the argument works: suppose a person A is playing a game, then it is reasonable to
89 R. Dworkin, op. cit., pl51.
90 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth Press, 1977), pi 51.
91 R. Dworkin/ The Original Position' ,in N. Daniels (ed.) Reacting Rawls, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 
pl8.
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think that he would have agreed to a numbers of rules if he had been asked in advance 
of play, and there must be reasons why A would have agreed if asked in advance as 
well. These may also be reasons why these rules may be enforced against A even if he 
has not agreed. This is a hypothetical agreement for A, of course, but it does not count 
as reason for enforcing the rules against A, as A’ s actual agreement would have, 
rather the argument for hypothesizing the rules is given by whatever independent 
reasons there are to support it.92
Perhaps, according to our goal, we can use the hypothetical contract argument to find 
the same ground of our political obligation and justification of punishment. But before 
we use the hypothetical contract argument for our purpose, there is a 
misunderstanding of this argument that needs to be mentioned. Some people would 
take the hypothetical contract argument as“ that because a man would have consented 
to certain principles if asked in advance, it is fair to apply those principles to him later, 
under different circumstances, when he does not consent. But that is a bad argument.” 
And he gives us an example: suppose a painter who did not know the value of his 
painting on Monday; therefore, if a customer came and offered $100 for it on the 
same day, the painter would accept. But if the painter found his painting was more 
valuable than $100 on Tuesday, then it would be unfair for any court to make the 
painter sell it to the customer for $100 on Wednesday. In this sense, Dworkin 
conclude: “ it may be my (the paintef s) good fortune that you did not ask me on 
Monday, but that does not justify coercion against me later.” 93
4.3 Rights, Punishment and Hypothetical Contract Argument
Now turning to the ground of our political obligation and justification of punishment. 
As Simmons mentions, “ Consent theory respects our belief that the course a maif s 
life takes should be determined, as much as possible, by his own decisions and 
actions.” According to this belief, any political authority and correlative obligations 
are legitimated only if it is established via peopld s consent, and the theory also tell us 
that peopld s obedience to rules and institutions are justified if these arise as the
92 R. Dworkin, ibid., pl51.
93 R. Dworkin, ibid.. p i52.
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consequence of their consent. The hypothetical contract argument s standpoint, 
however, is quite different from this. For the consent theory, our political obligations 
can be justified only on the ground of consent. That is why it is so important for this 
theory to prove that citizens actually consent to their political authority and 
correlative obligations. But for the hypothetical contract argument, the meaning of 
contract is like a dialogue, and it exists nowhere except in our own mind. In this sense, 
the whole argument is metaphorical, and its language is a way for us to put ourselves 
as contractors, that is, to look at things from others’ point of view. We then try to infer 
and explain why people, in thought, ought to consent to their political obligations. 
According to this method, we may reason out why we should have rights, rules and 
punishment in though: if a group of rational men did find themselves in the pre- 
political society, according to the uncertainties and scarcities of their life, then they 
would contract for certain laws or the authority of political institutions. Though they 
may have different plans for their life or different ends, and have their own point of 
view, they are facing the same problem, the problem is relative to everyone of them. 
To solve this problem, they need to cooperate with each other. Therefore, we will not 
be too wrong to say that they will try to find a solution that is acceptable to all of them. 
For practical reasons, they will realize that no ond s interests should be put on the top 
of the list, or be superior to otherd benefit. If so, that will cause a lot of debates and 
difficulties in their reasoning. This is the reasoning we may hypothesize the citizen 
would adopt. Of course, we do not suppose that the ‘ contracf in this argument is an 
actual or historical contract, or, as an actual contract, can be used to enforce the law 
against people, rather it works as a metaphor, a way to help us to put ourselves in the 
position of contractors and see if there is a acceptable solution. Furthermore, it can be 
used to examine the argument that makes the contract, in Dworkiri s terms, “ an 
appropriate representational devicd’ .
The same strategy can also be used in the case of punishment. Suppose that people 
live in a society without punitive institutions or laws. As human beings, they have 
certain rights, and they know that their rights are very important for them to pursue 
their ends. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose these people, if they are rational and 
prudential, will agree that rights are equally important to any one of them, and if they 
think about the possibility of the violation of their rights, they will look for an 
effective way to protect their rights from that harm. For this reason, we may infer that
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they will agree that the most effective way to protect their rights is to establish a form 
of legal sanction which may protect the rights-holder from the harm of the offender. 
Therefore, they might agree, in thought, that the necessary consequences of certain 
voluntary acts such as rights-violations must be prescribed as punishment, and the 
offender should be liable to be punished for his offence. Furthermore, they should 
agree that rights-offender should be liable to punishment, then they would also be 
liable to be punished if they offend others. Though they know that punishment 
involves the deprivation of certain normally recognized rights, or other measures 
considered unpleasant to the offender, they will agree to take these as the cost of 
protection. Thus each rational person, who claims rights and realizes that to be 
effective they need to be enforced, will accept a liability on their own point to accept 
punish, should they themselves violate the rights of others. In this sense, punishment 
needs not to be actually consented to by the violator, but it is a reasonable conclusion 
that is derived from our hypothetical contract argument. According to this argument, 
we may say that a offendef s liability to punishment is a product of a hypothetical 
contract that the offender would have consented to, had be thought through the 
impllications of his own rights claims
The way of inference in the whole argument, as we mentioned before, might look like 
the contract theory and consent argument, but they are different. For the contract 
theory and consent argument are seeking for an actual agreement, express or tacit, as a 
ground of the political obligation and punishment, and that is why they face the same 
problem: if we cannot prove that there is such a agreement, then the whole structure 
of beliefs collapses. But the hypothetical contract argument and all it stands for is not 
an argument for the grounds of contract or consent, rather it is an argumentative 
device. What it tries to explain is a structure of reasoning, and with it we could, in 
thought, come to the most acceptable conclusion concerning the consistency of rights- 
claims and the traditional practices of punishment by hypothesizing that each person 
seeks an agreement with all others. We use the social contract device to reach the 
conclusion that punishment is justifiable to rights-holders and claims as the product of 
an hypothetical agreement
Some people might criticize that the whole argument is based upon the congruence of 
reason, for it is conducted by isolated individual, and if the conclusion of his
reasoning should be supposed to be a appropriate decision for everyone, then we must 
presuppose that everyone would give the same solution to the same social problem 
they face to from their practical reasoning; however, it seems to be difficult to prove 
that this presupposition is true; hence, the hypothetical argument might be an 
acceptable structure of deliberation, but it is hard to say that everyond s deliberation 
would reach to the same conclusion, or they should all accept a solution to their 
similar problems from one individual s deliberation.
It is true that everyone stands up to their problem from their own point of view, 
including the thinker of hypothetical argument, but now the problem is the social 
problem, that is to say, the problem that all of them, including the thinker, are 
involved, and, therefore, any solution for it will have to be acceptable to all social 
members. For this reason, the thinker who tries to find the solution by hypothesizing 
should put himself in the position of other contractors to find out if his suggestion is 
plausible to others in thought. The calculation in the hypothetical contract argument 
might become harder in respect of many different ends, goods or values, but the 
thinkef s solitary deliberation, according to this procedure, would have to reach a 
compromise conclusion which will be reasonable and acceptable by all others.
Therefore, the hypothetical contract argumentative seems to be a possible way of 
dissolving the paradox of punishment, and successfully avoid two major problems the 
consent argument has to face, that is, the problem of criminal s consent to his or her 
liability to punishment and the problem of the reality of the existence of such consent. 
For the second problem, it is clear that a “ hypothetical’ argument does not have 
difficulties about “ reality’ , because “ the only relevant pressure for agreement comes 
from the desire to find and agree on principles which no one who had this desire could 
reasonably rejecf’94. Moreover, as for the first problem, the hypothetical contract 
theorist may say that even if the criminal insists that he does not consent to his 
punishment, he ought to have consented, for he, as a member of our society and 
wishing to preserve his life and rights, would have, for the sake of his rights, 
consented to the punishment of any rights-offender. J. J. Rousseau has put it well in 
these words: “ he who wills the end wills the means also, and the means must involve
94 T. M. Scanlon, ‘ Contractualism and Utilitarianism in J. Rachels (ed.). Ethical Theory 2, (Oxford:
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some risks, and even some losses.” Hence, “ it is in order that we may not fall victims 
to an assassin that we consent to die if we ourselves turn assassin^’95, and we can see 
that this argument can take both punishment and rights seriously, and show“ how this 
can be so despite the fact that in punishing we subject people to treatment that in other 
contexts would violate or at least infringe their rights.” 96 This problem is solved, as 
the hypothetical contractualist says, by referring to moral principles which concern 
both rights and the most effective way to protect them, that is, the liability to be 
punished if any one fails to respect othef s rights. Such principles are considered to be 
those which should be consented to, and no one, especially the offender, can 
reasonably reject. In the particular case we have been discussion, the principles 
ground the justifiability of punishment.
Oxford University Press), pi 10.
95 J. J. Rousseau, The social contract, trans. by G. D. H. Cole, (London: J. M. Dent &Sons Ltd), Book 
n, V p30.
96 W. Quinn, ‘ The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punishment in A. J. Simmons, M Cohen, J. 
Cohen, and C. R Beitz (ed), Punishment, p.49.
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SECTION 5 
CONCLUSION
After the discussion of justification of punishment, we may find that, as W. Quinn 
says,“ most of us feel certain that punishment is, in many cases, fully justified. But as 
to the nature of the justification we are perplexed and uncertain” 97 In regard to the 
conception of human rights, the practice of punishment can be morally justified only 
if it will neither infringe nor violate a criminal s rights. Now since we have briefly 
overviewed the two arguments in human rights theory and their justification of 
punishment, we may conclude by evaluating their solutions to the problem of the 
paradox of punishment. In regard to the utilitarian argument, we may see the failure of 
applying direct utilitarianism. If we simply concern the value of rights as to maximize 
welfare, and we punish wrongdoers with respect to utility in particular cases, then 
there is no doubt that we may lose both the moral force of rights against the 
interference from others, and the threshold against the possibility of punishment of the 
innocent or exploitation of the guilty. Hence, an alternative way for the utilitarian is 
turn to the indirect utilitarian argument, or, more precisely, institutional utilitarianism. 
Institutional utilitarian argument, such as RawN argument, can justify rights in 
institutions which are established under principles that are justified on the ground of 
utility, and such institutions which protect rights will do so by establishing rules 
which also justify punishment. Rights includes the specific provision that those who 
offend rights may be punished legitimately. The paradox of punishment is dissolved 
in the detail of the rules.
The other rights argument purporting to justify punishment is the consent theory. As 
we have sketched it, if we can built the violatof s liability to be punished upon his 
agreement, that is, his consent to his punishment, then the paradox of punishment will 
be solved just as it is solved in the utilitarian argument. No offender, if the consent 
argument is true, then, can say that the practice of punishment cannot be morally 
justified and that it will either infringe or violate his rights. Since the offender agreed 
to stay in his society as one of the members, exercised his rights, and with full 
knowledge of the necessary consequences of any right-violations, that is, punishment
97 W. Quinn, op. tit., p.47.
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according to the rules, then he has consented to these rules, and once he voluntarily 
interfered with anothef s rights, we may say that his punishment is consented to by 
him. According to the argument itself, the paradox of punishment, it seems, can be 
solved smoothly in this way, and the structure of inference of this argument seems to 
be quite sound. However, the truth of its conclusion is highly dependent upon the 
truth of its premises, unfortunately, it is hard to prove that the criminal does consent to 
his liability to be punished, especially when the criminal insists that he consents to 
nothing, nor can his voluntary action be regarded as an agreement to his punishment, 
because, though he has full knowledge of the necessary consequences which are 
prescribed in law, he simply disagrees it. In such cases, the consent theorist seems to 
be unable to convince the offender that his disavow is invalid.
Therefore, the consent s approach requires another way which can exclude the 
problem of honest disavowed, but still found the offendef s liability to punishment 
upon his consent. The hypothetical contract seems to be suitable for these purposes. 
This argument refers to principles “ which no one could reasonably reject’98 rather 
than to principles which everyone does reasonably accept. For the paradox of 
punishment, this argument put us in a position as contractors, and considers the 
situation in which people face sever dangers to their rights, and it supposes that these 
dangers can be avoided if there are rules which prescribe peoples duties to respect 
others rights and enforce the liability to be punished if anyone fails to do so. If we 
know that there is such a way to protect our rights and that no one would have to face 
the dangers of living in chaos, then these rules which prescribe the offendef s liability 
to punishment should be consented by us, for even those offenders, “ who are not now 
moved by the desire for agreement, could not reasonably reject should they come to 
be so moved.” 99
With regard to these arguments for punishment, it seems to me that both hypothetical 
contract argument and the institutional argument are plausible to solve the paradox of 
punishment for the reason that I have given. However, I think, if compare 
hypothetical contract argument with utilitarian argument, the hypothetical contract
98 T. M. Scanlon, op. tit., p. 111.
99 T. M. Scanlon, op. tit., p. 111.
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argument for me is more like an abstract moral principle than an actual guideline in 
our imperfect world. It is not to say that the hypothetical contract argument is not 
concerned to seek for principles which apply to our real world. Rather the critique of 
these principles, that is, the ground upon which people can decide which are the 
principles that no one can reasonable deny, seems not to be prescribed in the 
hypothetical argument. On the contrary, the utilitarian approach seems can give us a 
strike answer to these fundmantle questions: what should social laws and rules do for 
us? Why shall we need them in our society? How can we decide which kind of social 
rules is better than others? The utilitarian answer to all of them is simple but 
convincing: the purpose is to improve our welfare. However, the hypothetical contract 
argument seems spend a lot of its effort to find out the agreement with which only 
morality and rationality are concerned, not our imperfect world; hence, for my 
opponent, it might not be a practical strategy for those who try to directly apply this 
argument as principles for building rules for their everyday life, especially when they 
face the problem of competition between people1 s claim rights. Furthermore, in our 
imperfect world, it will be more convenient to have guidelines which * might be 
reasonable accepted by people than getting some abstract principles which ‘ no one 
can reasonable reject . The argument for justifying rules in society could be a 
hypothetical argument, though, the critique, or, in another words, the principle of rules 
will be more practical if it is based upon the principle of utility. For this reason, I 
think, since the paradox of punishment can also be considered as the effect of 
competition between claim rights (the competition between the claim rights of the 
offender and the claim rights of his victim) in our real world, the argument which is 
based upon the ground of welfare seems to be more practical than the argument which 
based upon the hypothetical inference.
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